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I.  EASTERN RELIGION AND WESTERN SCIENCE 
Since the question mixes religion and science, an initial caveat will suggest 
caution in the subsequent analysis. The Eastern views offered are typically both 
old and religious. The Western problem is recent and (para)scientific. The West is 
unsure whether or how far the natural sciences help us to value nature, but in any 
case the West needs to value nature in the midst of its sciences, notably (1) 
evolutionary ecoscience, which describes the way biological nature operates, and 
(2) technological science, which permits humans to prescribe the uses to which 
nature will be put. Can Eastern religions help the West in its science to value 
nature? 
Western scientists and theologians both know that one ought to mix religion 
and science with great logical care, a conviction hard won after four centuries of 
struggle. Religion and science, some say, speak two different languages, and to 
confuse the two is to make a category mistake, something like confusing the 
languages of poets and lawyers. For lawyers to write rhymes and for poets to 
write legal briefs only results in disaster. Christians (at least the more educated 
among them) have learned not to look to Genesis for science; they look there for 
the meaning of creation, not for precursors of scientific laws. The steps of the six- 
day creation do not legislate any order that evolutionary theory must discover, 
Christians made a category mistake to think that the Biblical passages which 
recorded that the sun rose and set prescribed Ptolemaic theory and proscribed 
Copernican theory. Pope Pius XII was fallible when he hoped, on the basis of 
Genesis, that the big bang theory was true and the steady state theory false 
Christians look to the Bible for the meaning of life but find nothing there that 
sets either an agenda or limits for physics or biology. They take the results of 
science, where these seem to be established, and then try to put the best interpre-
tation they can on them in the light of their experiences of meaning in the world. 
The result is sometimes the complementarity, sometimes the independence, and 
sometimes the conflict of science and religion. But these logical tracks must be 
carefully specified. Bioscience tells me how my arm goes up. The meaning of this 
event—that I am waving to my girl—lies in another realm. 
What, then, when we take an Eastern turn? After the Western experience, the 
East will have to wonder whether, to take a Taoist example, it is a category 
mistake to think that the yang and yin suggest anything for biology or physics. 
Perhaps Taoists should not prefer oscillating universes over a single universe ever 
expanding from a once-only big bang. Taoism is little evidence for the binary 
electronic theory of matter with its opposite and balanced positive and negative 
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charges. The yang/yin does not prescribe any more for science than does the six- 
day creation. The vital force, ch'i, the principle of harmony, should not lead 
Taoists to prefer an ecological theory that emphasizes harmony and cooperation 
and to dislike a theory that is more mechanistic, conflict-prone, or pluralistic, or 
that (as recent ecological theory has often done) deemphasizes equilibrium. 
What we may be getting here are seemingly objective reports of the world that 
need to be demythologized. These may be subjective reports of meanings con-
strued in the heads and hearts of Taoists, not scientific or prescientific descrip-
tions of ecosystems. What Taoists must do, as must Christians and Jews, is to 
take the descriptions of science, absent any prescriptions to them, and see 
whether their experiences accord with these descriptions. If so, well and good; if 
not, they may want to think further. 
  Yet the Taoist model does (quite as much as Christians once thought the 
Genesis account) did seem to describe causal forces in natural history. It seems to 
offer a model for ecosystems, for evolutionary theory, and even for cosmology. 
Perhaps the model importantly tells us what subjective reformations humans can 
undergo, but such experiences would seem to be appropriate for valuing nature 
only if the subjective reformation is congruent with the valued natural objects. 
 One possibility is that the Eastern saints were also keen observers of nature and 
analyzed the way the world works better than did Western scientists, at least until 
ecology came to the fore. Ecology (it might be thought) is a middle-level science, 
not a microscience or an astronomical science. One does not need microscopes or 
telescopes, Geiger counters or ultracentrifuges; one needs to watch successions 
over decades, the seasons, and the ebb and flow of life at native ranges, and here 
Taoist descriptions of nature may have anticipated ecology. Perhaps Taoists saw 
the facts and then valued the facts better than the West; or perhaps the pheno-
menal facts, better seen, pointed these Orientals to a more adequate metaphysics 
than any discovered by Occidentals. Taoist religion, then, might prove comple-
mentary to ecological science. Taoists may have better discovered the meaning of 
life in relation to nature, because they had a better prescientific account of 
operational connections in nature, or vice-versa. 
There is, however, a more subtle aspect of the problem. Although the different 
languages spoken by science and religion are not to be confused, they are not 
completely insulated from each other. Though science is not metaphysics, it may 
presume a metaphysics or it may be compatible with some schemes of meta-
physics and not others. In this deeper sense, science may not be value-neutral; it 
may have a loaded metaphysical agenda, and here philosophers and theologians, 
East and West, can help by clarifying and critiquing the implicit, metaphysically 
laden assumptions of science. 
   That is why, for instance, Christians do not always have to take the results of 
science as canonical. Besides knowing that science routinely changes, they may 
also find that the sciences arrange to focus on some aspects of experience so as to 
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obscure or distort others, as in controversies over free will in behaviorist psy-
chology. They may suspect that a mechanistic metaphysics is being reflected in 
overly dogmatic claims about how the results of stimulus-response experiments 
are to be interpreted. Or, in evolutionary theory, they may suspect that the 
alleged randomness and accident in the evolutionary process is a veil for some-
thing that Darwinian theory is not catching because of secularist assumptions, a 
veil of spiritual processes that Christians did catch at Calvary and continue to 
detect in ongoing Christian life. Religion cannot suggest the content of any 
science, but it can notice the forms into which such content is being poured; it can 
also defend a content of its own and the legitimacy of pouring this into other 
forms. 
So it might be that an Eastern model of nature can critique the metaphysical 
assumptions in evolutionary ecoscience and in technological science and thereby 
help the West to value nature. Perhaps an Eastern metaphysics can offer a better 
model to go with Western science, interpreting that science and making it 
ethically responsible before its environment. But we cannot presume any such 
insight. A Taoist ecology might be more muddle than model, like a Christian 
biochemistry or a Hindu meteorology. We must inquire more particularly 
whether what the East believed before science helps the West to value nature after 
science. 
East, West, nature, science—all these words are of enormous scope, crammed 
into a single question. It may prove impossible to generalize, but it may be 
possible to test some representative answers. One presumption in what follows is 
that any Eastern help that can be exported West is unlikely to be sectarian, and it 
will probably lie in the mainstream of Oriental beliefs; also we presume that it is 
available for export. It is difficult to tear a practice out of the world view in which 
it is set, and what works in an Eastern climate might not work in Western culture 
because a particular conduct cannot be sustained without the metaphysics that 
backs it. The question we address is not whether Easterners can value nature for 
themselves, but whether they can help Westerners to value nature. Perhaps there 
is a metaphysics to which the West can be converted, though that seems unlikely. 
What seems more realistic to expect is that representative Eastern convictions 
will, in encounter with the West, provoke the West to reassess either its own 
theory or practice, resulting, for example, in a less anthropocentric framework 
and in a more sensitive ability to value nature. 
The test cases that follow are a springboard for such discussions. (Spring-
boards function well only when jumped on—hard!) These test cases also proceed 
with a methodology mixing the hard-nosed philosophy of science with that of the 
gentler discipline of comparative religion. The latter discipline seeks to make the 
most favorable, sympathetic case for a competing theory, accentuating strengths; 
the former discipline concentrates on a competing theory's weaknesses and looks 
at once for falsifications. Both approaches seem important in a search for 
understanding. 
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II.  KARMAN, REINCARNATION, AND BIOLOGICAL VALUE 
Consider the belief in karman and reincarnation, almost omnipresent in Eastern 
religions. Karman is a doctrine about the persistence of moral value. Such value 
is experienced to be present paradigmatically in human life, but unsatisfactorily 
resolved there; therefore, by religious logic, value is exported to other worlds, 
other generations, and also to nonhuman lives in the biological world. This 
stretches out morality from personal life and supposes it to be covertly present as 
a determinant in animal life, so that monkeys or snakes are what they are because 
of bad karman. Lives are of higher value, as far as individuals go, if they can get 
themselves reborn and have the possibility by stages of improvement to gain 
more value (merit, good karman). Serious disvalue is, alas, losing such karman. 
This belief has powerful meanings since it drives the soteriological quest (at 
least in the earlier stages) in classical Buddhism and Hinduism. What is its 
meaning for valuing nature, as this might be exported West? Daisaku Ikeda, a 
Japanese Buddhist keenly interested in biological conservation, says that karman 
and reincarnation make all living beings "blood relations," and support with 
religion the scientific finding that humans have relational links with all forms of 
life.1 The first Buddhist commandment is the injunction to        , noninjury, 
reverence for life, based on such belief. 
This can seem to complement biological values with metaphysical beliefs. 
Biologists find in Darwinian evolution evidence that we are all blood relations, 
and if Buddhists and Hindus can gain the belief also from religious sources, so 
much the better. Reverence for life, although a feeling known by conservation 
biologists almost universally, is rather hard to derive from pure biology; indeed, 
evolutionary biology is, in some senses, rather irreverent about life. Natural 
selection is pushing and hauling, a struggle for life. The survival of the fittest 
requires the early deaths of most individuals and has resulted in the extinction of 
ninety-eight percent of all species that have previously existed on earth. If one 
can derive from Eastern religion an additional reason for reverence for life, so 
much the more impetus toward biological conservation. 
Yet conservation biologists are not really interested in valuing zoological lives 
metaphysically as once-human lives, transmigrating souls, or karman charges in 
flux. At least qua biologist, a wildlife biologist's admiring respect for a bull 
snake cannot be based on the religious belief that it has been or might be 
reincarnated as someone's grandmother (much less on the belief that he or she 
might gain good karman by protecting such a soul-incarnating animal). The less 
biologists hear about a bat or a worm being a reincarnated person the better. 
Those in the West want to value snakes, bats, and worms as the causal and 
cybernetic products of natural forces, without projecting onto them unsolved 
moral problems from human life. Animals need to be valued for what they are 
intrinsically and for the instrumental roles they play in ecosystems. They need to 
be valued as biological agents and not as once-upon-a-time moral agents. 
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The West needs, for instance, a plausible account of the values lost in extinc-
tion and conserved in respeciation, an account of the differences between natural 
extinction as a normal turnover in evolutionary speciation and anthropogenic 
extinction without respeciation. We need an account of the seriousness of the loss 
of biological information in natural kinds, an account of valuing species as this 
relates to valuing individual organisms. We need to value what we are tempted to 
call "higher" against "lower" species, and sentient against nonsentient species. 
According to one reading, karman and reincarnation seem to say that nothing of 
metaphysical value is ever lost in extinction. Value is only reborn elsewhere. 
What is the relation between this conservation metaphysic and the conservation 
of biological value? 
The West needs a plausible account of admiring respect for alien life forms— 
jumping spiders and voles, for example. The injunction to         is initially im-
pressive, involving respect for all forms of life. But when scientists realize that the 
saints' beliefs about the sorts of beings toward which noninjury is commanded 
are metaphysically different, they will wonder whether, after Eastern beliefs 
about spiders and voles are demythologized, disenchanted, and positively bio-
logically informed, the doctrine of        can remain an effective force to 
support Western value theory. The West sometimes wants to value these crea-
tures because they are kin to humans, but just as often because they are not. 
There seems to be something nonanthropocentric about distributing respect for 
life through all the sentient kinds, and yet when the value distributed there is 
thought to be karman consequent from moral agency, how do we respect the 
dimensions of animal life that are nonmoral? Sometimes we want to admire alien 
experience, or even to admire life that has no sentient experience at all. 
Perhaps there is a deeper, esoteric meaning to karman and reincarnation, and 
the inquiry so far has only examined the popular, exoteric meaning. But before 
this foundational meaning can be exported West, Eastern interpreters will need 
to probe how the one level is separable from the other (a demythologizing 
project?) and how such a metaphysic can help in valuing the organisms that have 
resulted from speciation in an evolutionary ecosystem. Perhaps this can be 
accomplished by diagnosing in the West secular metaphysical assumptions that 
have made us insensitive to religious values present in all living things. 
Like an enzyme or catalyst that serves a particular function in the organism in 
which it evolved but which, serendipitously, can be put to additional beneficial 
uses by humans who cleverly assimilate it for medical, agricultural, or industrial 
purposes, there may be something in these Eastern beliefs that can trigger a more 
functional relationship with nature in the West. But it is not yet clear how this 
chemistry will work. 
III.  BINARY OPPOSITION AND EVOLUTIONARY NATURE 
When the Far East offers counsel to the ecologically distressed West, this is 
sometimes based on the law of binary opposition, or complementarity, the way 
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of the Tao with its oscillating yang and yin. "In Tao the only motion is 
returning."2 Huston Smith, born and bred in China, long the resident religious 
philosopher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, diagnoses how the 
West has been on a wild "yang trip," evidenced in science and resulting in the 
ecological crisis, against which "Taoism throws its ounces on the side of yin, 
but to recover the original wholeness."3 The ecological crisis results from too 
much muscle or machismo; the West needs a recovery of the feminine; we need to 
flow with nature, properly to attune ourselves to its rhythms in counterpoint. 
Only then can humans rightly value nature. The Tao that is descriptive of nature 
becomes prescriptive for human behavior. 
There is some risk in discussing a position that begins by affirming that it really 
cannot be talked about4 and goes on to claim that every position contains the 
seeds of its opposite5 (symbolized by the small dark center in the light half, and 
the light center in the dark half of the Taoist symbol). The model will frequently 
reverse its tones and be difficult to verbalize in the absence of perceptual expe- 
riences that support it. Nevertheless, if this model is exported to challenge 
conduct in the West, it is going to have to advance some positive claims before 
Western science and value theory. 
Here is metaphysics mixed with ethics, and the science and the religion need to 
be blended with care. Like accounts of the trinitarian God in the West, accounts 
of the binary Tao in the East are reports derived from meanings found in life. But 
just how is bipolar complementarity a description of the nature of nature? How 
do we move from the is to the ought, to a prescription for human conduct? 
(1) What does the model propose to describe? Is the yang/yin a phenomenal 
model, a model of natural processes resembling what the West would call a 
causal model? In this case it would seem to operate at the same level as does 
science, to compete or to be congenial with it, to be testable against science, and 
vice versa. So far as it says anything that can be talked about, the teaching about 
the Tao seems to be claiming scientific insight homologous with Newton's laws 
about the conservation of mass and energy or Darwin's law about the survival of 
the better adapted. Taoist laws about the succession of yang and yin strikingly 
endorse discoveries about homeostasis, natural cycles, and equilibriums. The 
Taoist ecological model predicts yang after yin after yang after yin, ever 
returning/recycling. 
Such paired complementarity can impressively be discovered in the natural 
world, first at the native ranges at which Taoists in Chinese ecosystems dis-
covered them, and then extrapolated over ranges where science has extended the 
human powers of observation. There is the oscillation of hot and cold, summer 
and winter, sun and moon. wet and dry. There are mountains and valleys, the 
male and the female, the sweet and the sour, growth and decay, waking and 
sleeping, waxing and waning, life and death. Physicists discover that the world is 
built with positive and negative charges, that energy and matter interconvert, 
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that north poles have their south poles, that particles have their antiparticles, that 
matter is both wave and particle. Biologists learn how the male/female dichoto-
my permeates higher plants, cryptogams, and algae, and how genes come in 
pairs. Meteorologists find warm and cold fronts, and astrophysicists even find 
that stars wax and wane and wonder whether the universe oscillates: big bang, 
big squeeze, big bang, big squeeze. Ecosystems especially seem prone to periodic 
successions, to cycles and rhythms, to returnings. Everything results from the 
negentropic yang and the entropic yin, dialectically entwined. 
(2) Or is the yang/yin a transphenomenal model at a deeper level than that at 
which science works, perhaps running in a different logical category, a metaphys-
ical model, not an empirical model, one of meanings and not of causes? In this 
case the findings of science would neither compete with nor confirm it directly. It 
would rather come into direct confrontation with the Western metaphysics 
beneath the scientific model. Some excess in a Western metaphysics (the 
dominion of man), driving the scientific view in both theory and practice (yield-
ing analytic science and technological science), might then be corrected by an 
Eastern metaphysics (binary complementarity), moderating the arrogance 
operating in science. 
Or does the claim run that what Western science (à la evolutionary ecoscience) 
is now discovering is really more commensurate with this Eastern binary meta-
physics than with the Western metaphysics (the God: man: nature hierarchy) that 
gave birth to science? The issue, then, is what sort of transphenomenal model (if 
any is needed at all) is metaphysically adequate to evolutionary ecoscience and to 
the value questions posed when humans, with the powers of technological 
science, find themselves threatening the nature out of which they have evolved 
and in which they must continue to live. 
In either case (the parascientific Tao, or the transphenomenal Tao), when 
a Westerner tries to import this view, there are problems. Employed so 
extensively, the Tao conflates many things that, outside of the persuasive 
influence of this paradigm, have no otherwise discoverable connection with 
each other in nature, none so far as the sciences that are said to be congenial with 
it have yet revealed. Even restricted to the Chinese categories, male and female 
have little to do with wet and dry, with mountains and valleys or with eating 
foods that grow above and below ground. The waxing of youths and the 
waning of the elderly is a different phenomenon from the sweet and the sour. 
The near omnipresence of sexuality in biology has nothing to do with the binary 
electronic theory of matter, and both are something else from succession in 
ecology. The phenomenal world of science is plural and diverse, and, though 
there are regularities and underlying structural themes, everything is not that 
connected to everything else. 
The Westerner whose science, with its implicit metaphysics, is challenged by 
Taoists will be prone to reply in kind: that Taoist teaching is equally a meta-
physics filtering what is found to be significant in science, and that the truth may 
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as well be that there is no Tao behind all these oscillations. To think that there is a 
Tao is rather like thinking that the same forces must be showing up throughout 
astrophysics, microphysics, biochemistry, meteorology, geology, ecology, and 
economics because equal marks show up so regularly in all the equations used in 
these sciences. If one chooses a plus-or-minus scale one can do a lot of mapping, 
but nothing follows about the interpenetrations of organisms and phenomena on 
all the different sorts of terrain one has mapped. Those who take scientific natural 
history seriously find genuine emergences of level phenomena that can sometimes 
be reduced and interrelated, but they may not find that the most adequate key to 
understanding these storied events, either phenomenally or metaphysically, is 
some mystic force bonding opposites called the Tao. 
Enormously more is going on than is illuminated by binary opposition. There 
is nothing particularly binary about the atomic table, or quantum theory in 
general, or excitation levels, or half-life in radioactive decay, or relativity theory; 
there is nothing particularly binary about the solar system, or Earth's tectonic 
plates, or black holes, or recurrent glaciation. Likewise with the genetic code, 
mutation, enzymes, glycolysis, the citric acid cycle, photosynthesis, neurotrans- 
mitters, and the evolution of sight, or of learning; and likewise with speciation 
and extinction, or with the arrival of humans and their cultural histories. 
Across all these events, one can, of course, find ups and downs, activity and 
rest, pluses and minuses, reversibilities and bilateral symmetries; but noticing 
that orogenesis and erosion characterize geomorphology or that enzymatic 
chemistries are often reversible does little to provide explanation when one is 
puzzling over the fact that, while the geological cycles—Precambrian through 
Pennsylvanian through Recent—repeat themselves, biological events superim-
posed on these cycles contain great historical novelty. After the complementary 
opposites are noticed, most of the work of scientific (and metaphysical) explana-
tion still remains to be done, and certainly the valuing of these natural pheno-
mena has not been finished. If the Tao exists, it might, like the laws of thermody-
namics, never be violated in nature, but it is also insufficient to explain much 
about the particular drama of natural history in its large-scale, emergent 
features. 
The West desperately needs an account of evolutionary nature that can 
explicitly enable its valuation, especially in view of the fact that many scientifi-
cally based accounts conclude that nonhuman nature has no value at all. In the 
big bang there is explosive raw energy, formed at once into particles, formed soon 
into hydrogen and helium, and formed later into stars, certain of which form 
heavier elements in the right proportions for life. These stars explode as super- 
novae; the matter is regathered into planets, with Earth becoming an experiment 
in life. The fossil stardust, radiated over by solar energy, spontaneously assembles 
itself into amino acids and preproteins protected in microspheres, and eventually 
develops into life. Life begins as single cells and, through increasing discoveries 
of new information that organisms code in DNA, develops into trilobites and 
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ultimately into dinosaurs, primates, and persons, all situated in their supporting 
ecosystems. This process, with its punctuated equilibria, undeterred by punc-
tuated catastrophic extinctions, over geological timespans builds from zero to 
five million species, from procaryotes to eucaryotes, from taxes and kineses to 
complex instinctive and learned acts, from objective to subjective life, from 
matter to mind and even spirit. Then humans look around to value the place they 
inhabit and the process that has produced them. 
From this standpoint, what help does the yang/yin model supply? How does it 
critique the view reached by the scientific story? The story is one of more out of 
less, not more of the same, a story of novel emergence, not repetitive oscillations. 
The ascent from microbes to men, from planets to persons, is not interestingly 
binary. Or if it is, one has hold only of the subroutines, not of the executive 
program, if there is one. An ecosystem is in dynamic equilibrium only on a 
narrow scale of observation; on a wider scale, evolutionary changes are inces-
sant and irreversible. The historical system is becoming what it never before 
was; it will never again be what it once was. Ecologists are now saying that 
dynamic equilibrium is less important, even on a narrower scale, than was once 
thought. 
  (3) Perhaps the Taoist model is not so much a descriptive claim, scientifically 
or metaphysically, about the way the universe is operating, as it is a prescription 
for human conduct. We expect too much when we think that the Taoist model 
can interpret all of cosmic or even Earth history; the West can only expect that 
the model might provide some advice for the contemporary present. Its scale of 
time may be not millennia, but rather decades and centuries. Its scale of magni- 
tude may be not microscopic or astronomical, but middle-range and ecological. 
  On these scales, balance is appropriate. Any natural population must operate 
with renewable resources; any cultural population must do likewise. The West 
has been on its wild yang trip because Americans migrated across an empty 
continent (so-called) and took a four-century growth trip unprecedented in 
recorded history. The Europeans, though remaining at home, took a similar 
growth trip when they extracted resources out of their newly founded colonies. 
This growth was fueled by, and fueled, Western science, with its metaphysics of 
exploitation. But all that is over now, as evidenced by the ecological crisis, and 
the Taoist model is a saner one for a society that has settled into a long-term 
relation with its surroundings. The West needs to import a stable metaphysics to 
match the realities of the carrying capacities of the ecosystems that support 
culture. Operating for many centuries in classical China, Taoists knew the 
meaning of the life of balance. Their model can be instructive. 
But it is difficult to make this advice of Taoism operational in the West, though 
it functioned well enough in the climate in which it originated. It may be right to 
say repeatedly "More yin; more yin" in making environmental decisions, but this 
is a little like saying "More love; more love" in making social decisions. The 
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advice is sound enough, but unless one has a more sophisticated model to explain 
what adding yin or love means in the making of nitty-gritty decisions, and unless 
one can work the new attitude into either policy regulations or the moral 
calculus, nothing comes of it. Does wu-wei, inaction, endorse a "hands off" 
rather than a "hands on" strategy in wilderness management? Is this a warning 
to geneticists who want to intervene and improve the timber species in our 
national forests? 
The Taoist myth may have contained appropriate recommendations for hu-
mans who sought the meaning of life in a rural, medieval culture, but it needs to 
be demythologized (or remythologized) to test whether it contains contemporary 
wisdom that can suggest how humans should behave when, through science, they 
have discovered the extent of historical change, discovered how natural systems 
actually function, and discovered technological powers to rebuild natural sys-
tems. Perhaps the Taoists had worked out details for a life of balance that applied 
only to bygone Chinese societies, where Taoism was in critical tension with 
Confucianism. Perhaps the call for more yin is good advice still. A golden mean 
is always sensible, even though the mean shifts from age to age and from culture 
to culture. But can this be translated into help in making decisions in the modem, 
industrialized, high-technology West? Can it teach the West what to preserve, 
where to compromise, and how much to sacrifice of what remains of the shrink-
ing wilderness? 
Perhaps it is too much to expect a high-level ethical maxim, drawn from a 
metaphysics, to be directly applicable to the problem. It will function more like 
a symbol or slogan, like "Less is more!" or "Nothing in excess!" and will set a 
mood or tone with which we approach life in the world, challenging the value 
matrix of competing maximizers that characterizes so much of the biology, 
economics, and politics within which Western decisions are made. This maxim 
can set a matrix of satisfactory balance, counter to the maximizing of consump-
tion. But can the maxim work like this, unless it stays in the ambience of the 
metaphysics that supports it? Can it show how these metaphysical beliefs trickle 
down to affect practical decisions? Can it catalyze any action in the West? 
IV. NONDUAL UNION AND BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY 
The West acutely needs an account of individuals in ecosystems, of diverse 
organisms integrated into a single biotic community, and of plurality in unity, 
and here an Eastern turn has often seemed promising. No perception is more basic 
to Eastern convictions than nonduality, as in Advaita Vedānta, or the emptying 
of all things in a perception of        , emptiness, in Buddhism.6 The Tao 
is incessant interpenetration, and in Zen every particle of dust contains the 
universe and engenders all its powers, These accounts vary in details; perhaps 
some versions are more available for export to the West than others. But it is 
unlikely that a specifically denominational account can be transplanted to the West; 
what is more likely is that a generic Eastern metaphysics can encounter and correct a 
182   Rolston 
mainstream Western view. We can take two such streams from Mahayana 
Buddhism, one flowing from the                  and, in the section to 
follow, one in the tradition of the Madhyamikas. 
The                provides a model of the universe in the analogy of a 
great net, made of precious gems, hanging over Indra's palace. "In each of these 
gems are found and reflected all the other gems composing the net; therefore, 
when it is picked up, we see in it not only the entirety of the net but every one of 
the gems therein." 7 Alternately, the world is like a candle surrounded on all sides 
by mirrors, each reflecting the candle and all the other mirrors. Enlightenment 
brings a sense of close-coupling with the other. That, says D. T. Suzuki, suggests 
how to solve the ecological puzzle of valuing the individual in community.8 It 
regains the original wholeness, otherwise lost in the fragmented, alienated West. 
The                 has the answer: all is one; one is all. 
A virtue here is that nonduality conquers human arrogance, of which the West 
has an ample share. The West itself has not lacked for analysts who have found 
pride to be a fundamental sin, and an old prediction is that ''The meek shall 
inherit the earth." Nevertheless, the West has also thought legitimate an exces-
sive human dominion over nature. Adding a Mahayana insight to the Taoist one 
explored earlier, the West can discover the interpenetration of all, humans 
included, in the One. Then the wild yang trip, really an adventure in arrogance, 
can be steered round to harmony and holism. Contrary to the anthropocentric 
view, the             view is biocentric. 
Or is it? This time we have a metaphor more than a model, and the metaphor 
may be metaphysics more than science. We have to ask again whether Indra's 
net is a poetic vision of what the West calls a causal model, to be confirmed 
or disproved by empirical discoveries in ecosystems. Or do we have a mean-
ing model instead, not necessarily one that can be directly congenial with or 
challenged by Western science but one that runs parallel in another logical 
category of explanation? It would then directly confront not science, but meta- 
science, perhaps to alert the West to background assumptions that are construct-
ing the nets with which science fishes. Either way, the metaphor-model does seem 
to be describing what is going on out there in the world at some level. Either by 
direct mapping or by an interlevel translation from metaphysics to science, we 
need to connect the model with operations in ecosystems. 
For example, there will be questions about autonomy and conflict, as well as 
about coaction. An ecologically informed valuer wants a discriminating plural-
ism that preserves biological integrity at the level of both organisms and systems. 
Intrinsic value requires that I see the other as other in its differences from me, 
from humans, and from other lives and objects—even its differences from the 
Absolute, if an Absolute exists. It requires some looseness and freedom, enough 
to protect individuality. Systemic value requires an account of things in their 
niches and roles, specific to local habitats. If everything is equally and intimately, 
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but also rather vaguely (nondiscriminatingly), connected to everything else, 
rising from one fundamental, inarticulate ground, then what are we to make of 
the differences? 
In ecosystems, the diverse connections are to be taken seriously; the differences 
of kind, species, trophic levels in food pyramids, autotrophs, heterotrophs, and 
phylogenetic descent are genuine and valuable differences in biological identity 
and role. Organisms may be quite close-coupled, as are symbionts or members of 
a breeding population. Or they may be quite loosely coupled or even decoupled. 
They may be siblings in close identity and competition, or they may inhabit 
niches so remote from each other that their lives never cross. Divergence is as 
important as relationship. Orchids are intimately related to their mycorrhizal 
fungi, but Calypso orchids in the Rocky Mountains have little connection with 
snow leopards in Tibet. Microbes play essential roles in ecosystems; they can be 
valued instrumentally; but climbing ferns are so rare that their role is negligible. 
Can they be valued intrinsically? The West needs help in discriminating Earth's 
five million species, articulating their connections, appreciating the sorts of 
relationships they have, and mixing the intrinsic value in organic individuality 
with the instrumental value of organisms in ecosystems, subsuming if necessary 
the value of individuals to the value of the community. 
At this point a nondual, inarticulate mystic union has got to go further. The 
candle with the reflecting mirrors is a pretty model, perhaps even a true meta-
physics; but it also becomes pretty muddled when a scientist tries to map, or an 
ethicist tries to value, an ecosystem with it. The central candle (the Absolute) 
supplies all the light, mirrored round and reflected back equally in all the 
otherwise empty mirrors, placed at the periphery. Does each mirror have an 
integrity of its own, with valued differences from the others? Or is each only a 
reflector? Even the sparkle of the gems in Indra's net is a reflection of borrowed 
light. How much is intrinsic to each particular gem? Light is reflected from the 
surface, and the flash and color are to some extent appearances in the eye of the 
beholder. The gems, too, are hardly more distinguished than mirrors in having 
individual integrity. Perhaps we should not expect a metaphor to convert to 
detail in a model; but perhaps the trouble lies not just in the limits of the 
metaphor but in the flaws in the metaphysics. 
The monotheism that (scientists and Easterners may say) has failed in the West 
has insisted that natural things have an existence derived from God; monotheists 
also sometimes speak of creatures mirroring the divine image, and they have tried 
to make the particular creatures into signs of the divine presence. But they have 
also wanted more than one in all and all in one. Their Yahweh bade Earth to 
bring forth myriad creatures of itself (that is, speciation) and pronounced each 
kind to be good intrinsically, endorsing the name and form manifest in each. God 
substantially and historically recognizes the various kinds. Though the        - 
     model tempers the anthropocentrism in the monotheist model, one can 
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wonder whether too much emptiness, or too much Absolute, has displaced the 
biological integrity to be found at the multiple loci of the net. 
How do we value conflict and struggle in ecosystems? Ecology has arisen 
within evolutionary theory, where Darwin's nature is in some sense a jungle. The 
cheetah rips open the gazelle; the gazelle eats the grass; each grass plant competes 
with its neighbors for nutrients, moisture, and space at the same time that it 
cross-fertilizes its neighbors in order to reproduce. In ecological succession, the 
spruce (with Taoist yang?) push out the aspen, and the aspen depend on fires to 
destroy the spruce (the yin returns!) and regenerate the aspen succession. The 
trees compete for sunlight and resist insect pests. Plants make allelopathic agents, 
poisons that inhibit the growth of their neighbors. 
Value in a living organism requires the "pushy" defense of individual integrity, 
which in return requires the destruction and capture of value in other living 
organisms, the claiming of resources that others might use. Is it going to help to 
envision this as light from a central source, flashing round gems and mirrors? Is 
this a competing metaphysics that can help the West to see where it overstates the 
conflict and competition in nature, and (as ecology has also done) to paint over 
the Darwinian survival of the fittest a new picture with more interfitting 
cooperation? 
Perhaps here the Mahayanas can fit in the noble truth of suffering,        , 
and show how everything is driven by thirst,     —except for the fact that, 
interpreted in such a way, the          cycle is something that Buddhists 
wish to stop. This world model hardly seems as pretty as Indra's net. Maybe it is 
only meant to suggest that humans should put a stop to their thirsts 
(abetted by Western dominance and consumerism) and find a more 
meaningful life of balance, realizing the interpenetration of all. But not 
only are humans driven by their thirsts; the ecosystem is driven that way too. 
The ecosystem is built on injury, value capture, and predation. Does it not go 
against the grain of such a system for one to preach noninjury,        ? Inspired 
by the metaphysics of Indra's net, no one would wish to damage the sparkling 
harmony in such a world. Perhaps that is the conclusion to which ecology is 
bringing us: interpenetration past competition, fitness past struggle. Even 
Darwin once expressed the hope that, as a result of evolutionary theory, 
humans, animals, and plants "may partake from our origin in one common 
ancestor" and "may be all netted together,"9 Indra's net suggests that kind of 
picture. But we still need to fit into this net some of the rules of Darwin's jungle, 
where the fittest survive. 
Ecologists need to value integrities embedded within niches and defended within 
ecosystems. They may not need Absolute Truth as much as relative truth. One 
does not want too deep an ecology too quickly; the "shallow" phenomena are 
also to be treasured. We sometimes need less eternity and more valuing of the 
ephemeral. Ecologists, qua ecologists, do not need mystic unity but discriminat-
ing plurality in systemic unity, an appreciation for contests in complementarity. 
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They need a convincing environmental pluralism with a convincing environ-
mental community, a model by which humans can compare themselves with 
nonhumans and compare nonhumans with each other, judging each for the 
intrinsic worth of their ecosystemic roles. 
Turning from a descriptive use of Indra's net to prescriptions that might follow 
from it, a myth of this kind is difficult to translate into action. Four examples can 
indicate the distance between mystic vision and environmental decision making. 
(1) Coloradans need to decide whether to trade water development on the 
Colorado River, providing growth and convenience for the Front Range cities, 
against the extinction of the humpback chub, a fish peculiarly evolved with its 
odd back as a stabilizer in the turbulent spring runoff. The chub cannot live in the 
lakes behind the dams that humans desire. Some model suggesting how to value 
human growth and convenience against the unique biological identity of an 
endangered species would help, but the chub envisioned as a gem in a net 
sparking equally with humans and with all other kinds of life contributes little to 
any decision here. 
(2) Californians need to decide whether to shoot several thousand feral goats 
in order to save three endangered plant species—Malacothamnus clementinus, 
Castilleja grisea, and Delphinium kinkiense—on San Clemente Island, sacrificing 
several goats for each known surviving plant. It would help to have a value 
theory that compares sentient life at the goat level—the goats dislocated from 
their native ecosystem and relocated as misfits in another—against the lives of 
plants, tokens of their species type, well-adapted to a rare island ecosystem. We seem 
to place high intrinsic value in the goats along with high negative instrumental 
value in their misfit location, set opposite the rare intrinsic value and high-quality 
but low-quantity instrumental value in the plants, which are the last tokens of 
an irreplaceable type. We have subjective experience in the goats to consider 
against merely objective life in the plants. To discover in the goats and plants 
that everything reflects everything else equally only obscures the issue of sub-
jectivity and objectivity in value that we here would like to have explicated. A 
vision of one in all and all in one is too unsophisticated—or, if you like, too 
sophisticated—to be of any help. 
(3) Florida state and federal authorities need help in resolving their disagree-
ment over whether it is worth spending twenty-seven million dollars to build 
forty bridges that will allow the nearly extinct Florida panther, a subspecies 
uniquely adapted to the swamps, to pass under the interstate highway being built 
across Big Cypress Swamp. The cost of these bridges is about one million dollars 
per panther. Land acquisition and related costs will bring the total to 112 
million—about ten dollars per Floridian and fifty cents per U. S. citizen. It would 
help to have some account of the worth of panthers, lithe and graceful predators 
on the top trophic rungs of the swamp ecosystem, versus the cost to citizens. Can 
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a Mahāyāna bodhisattva, after meditating on Indra's net, say anything that 
needs to be weighed seriously by decision-makers? 
(4) National park biologists in Wyoming needed help deciding whether to 
treat an outbreak of pinkeye among the Yellowstone bighorns, having resolved 
to keep the functioning of the Yellowstone ecosystem as much as possible 
uninterrupted by human activity. Their decision not to treat the disease resulted 
in the deaths by blindness, injury, and starvation of two hundred bighorns, or 
half the herd. That coincided with a flourishing of the Chlamydia microbe and 
resulted as well in a high golden eagle population, which feasted on the carcasses. 
Thus it would help to have a value theory that trades the worth of uninterrupted 
natural systems against the preventable suffering of wild sheep. Inspired by the 
vision of Indra's net, does one do nothing (following also the Taoist wu-wei, or 
practice noninjury,        , on the sheep or the microbes, or cultivate a sense 
of nonduality with the interpenetrating whole? 
To value nature, we need both horizontal and vertical accounts. The horizon-
tal account describes and values the natural kinds, the phenomena, in relation 
to each other. This will mix the descriptions of science with an axiology appropri-
ate to empirical things. The vertical account connects and evaluates the pheno-
mena in terms of a noumenal Ground. This will be metaphysics, not science. 
Indra's net seems to provide a horizontal (scientific, empirical, phenomenal) 
model simultaneously with a vertical (noumenal, metaphysical) model. But until 
they are further developed, the connections are rather nondiscriminating. 
It is perhaps a category mistake here to confuse the informing vision with a 
practical decision; this is like confounding again what poets and lawyers do. The 
vision is poetry; citizen and agency decision-making is the legal nitty-gritty. 
Dōgen at Eiheiji would not drink a full dipper of water from the mountain 
stream, but poured halfback into the stream, rejoicing in the river's onward flow. 
That is Zen poetry, and the West cannot expect to derive water law in Colorado 
from it, stipulating minimum stream flow for endangered fish species. It can only 
produce a reverence for the stream; and water law will follow. It can only define a 
value matrix; it cannot plot particular values on that matrix. 
Yet if we have no translation scheme between these categories, the heavenly 
poetry is of no earthly use. We do not fault the religious depth of vision because it 
lacks empirical information that the biosciences can supply, but we do expect it 
to function as a diagnostic symbol. When such empirical information is supplied, 
and when value questions arise in result, we are dismayed when the vision is too 
nondiscriminating to be operational. A metaphysics can hardly be expected to 
provide a blueprint for action, but if a metaphysics cannot orient action in some 
meaningful way, then it is of no help where the West needs help—valuing the 
environment that humans inhabit. Such a theory cannot be put into practice 
environmentally, though perhaps it can be put into practice in other ways— 
existentially or soteriologically. 
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V.  NIRVĀNA, EMPTINESS, AND EXTINCTION 
At least it can be said that the                affirms things—all things 
equally like gems in a net—and errs on the side of excessive affirmation. Nothing 
is despised, however lowly it might be; the bodhisattvas vow to enlighten the last 
blade of grass. Phenomenal things are intimately identified with the divine. All is 
one; one is all. 
But such excessive affirmation is not always the case. When the Eastern depth 
evaluation does come, there sometimes is a tendency to extinguish the pheno-
mena—a threat of extinction (to pose the issue in provocative terms) about 
which any would-be borrowers of such an evaluation in the West will have some 
uneasiness. We can notice the etymological alliance of          ("going out") with 
extinction, to open the issue,10 and turn to Mādhyamika Buddhism as a repre- 
sentative case. Additional troublesome and related words are      , empty, 
and         , Emptiness. 
These are metaphysical words, used with great deference; Mādhyamika some-
times says that it makes no claims at all with them, at least no conceptual claims 
that can be separated from perceptual experience. Silence is what is most appro-
priate. Still, if anything is to be available for export, something about nature is 
going to have to be said with these words. And, metaphysical terms though they 
are, they do seem to be applied to the phenomena.          , as well as         , 
is said to be      , empty.   Some characteristics (for example,      , 
thirst, or       , suffering) that drive         will be extinguished in         . 
Precisely what gets extinguished? How does this involve the valuing of nature? 
Nāgārjuna, the founding figure in Mādhyamika Buddhism, hopes for the great 
"quiescence of plurality" in Emptiness.11 With the "cessation of phenomenal 
development,"          is seen to be        .12 "That state which is the rushing 
in and out of existence when dependent or conditioned—this state, when not 
dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be       ."13 "There ... nothing 
moves, neither hither nor thither."14 Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna's disciple, tells us 
that in        there will be "no existence, no ego, no living creature, no 
individual soul, no personality, no Lord." "There is in it no individual life 
whatever."15 Such description suggests that phenomena face a perilous brush 
with extinction at the noumenal level. 
This description of        affects the valuation of phenomena. Unredeemed, 
this world is "a mirage, a magical illusion, a dream, a mock show, an airy castle 
in the sky, a bubble on the water, a passing stir in the wind."16 The world is "a 
disease, a boil, a thorn, a misfortune."17 "In antagonism to the entire world is the 
enlightenment of the Tathagatas,"18 Candrakīrti says that after the Buddha has 
"hit the absolute reality," Buddha exclaims, "There is here in this world neither 
reality, nor absence of illusion. It is surreptitious reality, it is cancelled reality, it 
is a lie, a childish babble, an illusion!"19 Candrakīrti praises the beauty of 
Mādhyamika: "It saves us from the misery and from phenomenal existence 
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altogether," "There is in this plurality not the slightest bit of what is absolutely 
real, ... nothing at all to justify the claim that a phenomenal reality has been 
established by us."20 
There is some positive truth in such valuation; the phenomena are not ab-
solutely real, and, treated as an object of craving, the world reliably yields 
misfortune. The Mādhyamikas' intensity here may be psychologically necessary 
to achieve certain personal transformations for which they strive. But, taken 
logically as claims about nature, neither are the phenomena absolutely surrep-
titious; we in the West want positively to establish phenomenal existence, not to 
cancel it. We want the world redeemed, to speak religiously; or, better, we want 
humans to be redeemed in their world. Perhaps Mādhyamika Buddhism can help 
the West to value nature, challenging the West to repent from its aggrandizing 
attitude; perhaps the West can help Mādhyamika Buddhism to revalue nature, 
challenging it to repent for an excessive devaluing of nature. 
  A principal Buddhist scholar in the West, Edward Conze, after a lifetime of 
studying the Mādhyamika texts, concluded:  "The teachings of the     
     have little significance for the present age. To be quite truthful, they are 
equally irrelevant to any other age. They are meant for people who have with-
drawn from society. ... Leaving worldlings to get on with their worldly prob-
lems, these Sūtras assume that the whole sense-linked, or conditioned, world is 
unsatisfactory, and that preoccupation with it is unworthy of our true mission in 
life." 21 That does not sound promising for a search for help in an environmental 
crisis, which is, after all, a worldly problem. 
Perhaps there is paradox here: some dialectic between emptiness and fullness, 
so that one must extinguish the world to regain it; some analog to the losing of life 
in order to gain it of which Jesus speaks, a death and resurrection of the world. It 
has often seemed to outsiders that Calvinist teachings about predestination 
should logically lead to paralysis in the world. If God foreordains every event, 
what place has human effort? But, to the contrary, insiders found the teaching 
invigorating and went hard to work building a better world, bringing in the 
Kingdom of God. Outsiders may think that Mādhyamika Buddhism devalues 
the phenomena in emptiness; insiders find, to the contrary, that it rightly revalues 
the phenomena. Then they can go to work conserving nature. But truth that 
works by paradox is going to be difficult to export to the West. 
Mādhyamika's total extinction of phenomenal existence is only one of many 
Buddhist moods, only an early part of a bigger truth, and even Mādhyamika 
Buddhism promises, with penetration on the far side of      , to give 
back   as       , to give back the phenomena. "There is nothing whatever 
which differentiates the existence-in-flux (        ) from        ; ... There is 
not the slightest bit of difference between these two."22 What this means, if it 
means anything statable to those with no vision of      , is going to be 
difficult to export. 
    Buddhism knows how desire drives not only ecosystems but human life, and 
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Buddhism can chasten and contain human desire. It is often said that when 
Buddhism moved to China and Japan it underwent a this-worldly transforma-
tion. Zen Buddhists insist that the mountains return as mountains after one has 
seen their emptiness. Their haiku will give us glad hearts before nature—frogs, 
violets, snow, the autumn moon. The yang and yin of the Tao can be super-
imposed on the emptiness of         . Chinese and Japanese artists, religiously 
inspired, sometimes developed great aesthetic sensitivities toward nature. So 
there is evidence that Buddhism sometimes knows how, by way of the reciprocal 
interpenetration of the absolute Buddha-world and the world of individual 
phenomena, to give an inclusive unity to all things without robbing each indi-
vidual of its own special meaning in the universe. 
In the same century that the West has come to need help in valuing nature, so 
seriously that it considers importing Eastern religious thought, the East has often 
sought help and imported Western science and technology. The East now faces 
on its own soil the task of applying its religions to these sciences for an effective 
valuing of nature. Assuming that a theory should apply (be operational) and bear 
fruit in at least this sense, a test of the power of Eastern thought will be to see how 
environmental problems are resolved in industrialized Eastern nations—Japan 
or Taiwan for example. 
An even more critical test case will be to study events in Hawaii—a critical case 
environmentally and a crossroads of East and West. An island ecosystem fragile, 
possessing many endemic species, and of great beauty. Hawaii is a bellwether 
state for environmental concern. Of sixty-eight species of birds unique to the 
Hawaiian Islands, forty-one are now extinct or virtually extinct. Of endemic 
plants, 250 are already extinct and half the remaining 2,200 species are endan-
gered or threatened. More bird, animal, and plant species have become extinct in 
Hawaii than in all of North America. Domesticated animals—cattle, goats, 
pigs—have played havoc with the native flora, and deforestation and develop-
ment have seldom been planned so as protect the fauna. What have Eastern 
influences in Hawaii been able to contribute to the solutions of these problems? 
What might they contribute? 
The West awaits arguments and creative solutions that, without requiring a 
conversion to Buddhism, Taoism, or Hinduism, it can borrow and use as 
catalysts to illuminate the complexities of evolutionary ecoscience, to criticize its 
own valuations of nature, and to make decisions before the environmental 
tradeoffs it faces. My own judgment is that the East needs considerable reformu-
lation of its sources before it can preach much to the West. 
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